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Abstract This article reports investigations of inferences that
depend both on connectives between clauses, such as or else,
and on relations between entities, such as in the same place
as. Participants made more valid inferences from bicondi-
tionals—for instance, Ann is taller than Beth if and only if
Beth is taller than Cath—than from exclusive disjunctions
(Exp. 1). They made more valid transitive inferences from a
biconditional when a categorical premise affirmed rather than
denied one of its clauses, but they made more valid transitive
inferences from an exclusive disjunction when a categorical
premise denied rather than affirmed one of its clauses (Exp.
2). From exclusive disjunctions, such as Either Ann is not in
the same place as Beth or else Beth is not in the same place
as Cath, individuals tended to infer that all three individuals
could be in different places, whereas in fact this was
impossible (Exps. 3a and 3b). The theory of mental models
predicts all of these results.
Keywords Deductive reasoning.Sentential connectives.
Relations.Mental models
Consider the following inferential problem:
Either Ann is taller than Beth or else Beth is taller than
Cath, but not both.
So, is it possible that Beth is the tallest of the three?
The logically correct answer is yes, and the validity of the
inference depends both on the sentential connective or else,
which interrelates the two clauses, and on the relations is
taller than and is the tallest of, which interrelate entities.
Previous studies have investigated how people understand
connectives and make inferences from them, and how
people understand and make inferences from relations. But
no empirical studies have examined reasoning that hinges
both on connectives and on relations, and this novel domain
challenges theories of reasoning. The present article
addresses this challenge and reports some new phenomena
concerning such inferences.
Relations in everyday discourse have various logical
properties, of which perhaps the three most important are
transitivity, symmetry, and reflexivity (Tarski, 1965, chap.
V). A relation such as is in the same place as is transitive
because if A is in the same place as B and B is in the same
place as C, then A is in the same place as C. It is symmetric
because if A is in the same place as B, then B is in the same
place as A. And it is reflexive because A is in the same
place as A. A relation such as is taller than is transitive, but
it is asymmetric because if A is taller than B, then B is not
taller than A, and it is also irreflexive because A is not
taller than A. Relations do have other logical properties
(see Tarski, 1965), but these properties are recondite and
seldom, if ever, relevant to everyday discourse. Indeed,
most relational terms in language have no important logical
properties—for instance, A loves B is neither transitive nor
intransitive, neither symmetric nor asymmetric, and neither
reflexive nor irreflexive.
Previous psychological studies have investigated how
individuals make inferences from transitive relations—for
instance, Ai sb i g g e rt h a nBand B is bigger than C;
therefore, A is bigger than C (e.g., Clark, 1969; Huttenlocher,
1968). Transitive inferences occur in everyday life, in
intelligence tests, and in inferring economic preferences
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inferences depends on the number of relations that must be
integrated (Viskontas, Morrison, Holyoak, Hummel, &
Knowlton, 2004), the distance between queried elements
(Mynatt & Smith, 1977), and the elicitation of extraneous
visual images (e.g., Knauff, Fangmeier, Ruff, & Johnson-
Laird, 2003). Previous studies have also examined
inferences based on two-dimensional spatial relations,
temporal relations, and relations between relations, and
have shown that the difficulty of inferences also depends
on the number of possibilities in which the premises hold
(e.g., Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989; Carreiras & Santamaria,
1997; Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 2005, 2006; Schaeken,
Johnson-Laird, & d’Ydewalle, 1996). Other studies have
shown that some relations are pseudo-transitive—for in-
stance, A is a blood relative of B—because individuals tend
to make transitive inferences from them unless they are cued
to counterexamples (Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 2008).
The connectives that occur in everyday discourse include
if, and,a n dor. These connectives resemble those of
sentential logic (see, e.g., Jeffrey, 1981), but the degree of
resemblance is a matter of controversy, especially in the
case of if (e.g., Evans & Over, 2004; Girotto & Johnson-
Laird, 2004; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Oaksford &
Chater, 2007). Psychologists have carried out many studies
of inferences from conditional assertions, if A then B, where
the values of A and B are clauses, such as there is a vowel
on a card (for reviews, see, e.g., Evans & Over, 2004;
Johnson-Laird, 2006). These studies, as well as those of
other connectives such as or else, concern inferences that
hinge solely on the connectives, and not on relations
between entities that are described in their individual
clauses (e.g., Braine & O’Brien, 1998; Johnson-Laird,
Byrne, & Schaeken, 1992).
Current accounts of reasoning include those based on
formal rules of inference (e.g., Braine & O’Brien, 1998;
Rips, 1994), those based on suppositions (e.g., Evans &
Over, 2004), those based on probabilistic considerations
(e.g., Geiger & Oberauer, 2010; Oaksford & Chater, 2007),
and those based on mental models (e.g., Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 1991). None of these accounts has hitherto been
applied to inferences that depend on both relations and
connectives. Formal rule theories, however, apply to such
inferences, because these theories can postulate “meaning
postulates” to capture the logical properties of relations. For
example, the following meaning postulate captures the
transitivity of is taller than:
For any x, y, z,i fx is taller than y, and y is taller than z,
then x is taller than z.
Proponents of such theories have also proposed meaning
postulates for two-dimensional spatial reasoning (e.g.,
Hagert, 1984). But the case against meaning postulates
has been presented elsewhere (e.g., Goodwin & Johnson-
Laird, 2008). The suppositional theory of Evans and Over
(2004) and the probabilistic theory of Oaksford and Chater
(2007) have been applied primarily to if among the
sentential connectives, which these theories analyze in
terms of the conditional probability of the then clause,
given that the if clause is true. Although both of these
theories might be extended to other connectives and to
reasoning that hinges on both relations and connectives,
these extensions have yet to be made. Our aim is therefore
to follow up the predictions of the theory of mental models
rather than to try to pit one theory against the others,
because of the uncertainty about their predictions.
The mental model theory— the “model” theory, for
short—applies to both relations and connectives (e.g.,
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). It is based on three
principles: First, a representation of the meaning of an
assertion is used to construct mental models of each
distinct sort of possibility to which the assertion refers.
Second, mental models are iconic insofar as they can be;
that is, the structure of a model corresponds to the
structure of what it represents (see Peirce, 1958). Third,
mental models represent what is true at the expense of
what is false (the principle of truth). According to this
account, reasoners use the meaning of premises and their
knowledge to construct mental models of premises, and
depending on whether a conclusion holds in all, most, or
some of the models, they draw a conclusion of its
necessity, possibility, or probability.
According to the model theory, logical properties such as
transitivityareemergentproperties from models(e.g.,Byrne&
Johnson-Laird, 1989; Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 2005;
Huttenlocher, 1968). Hence, the mental model of an assertion
such as Ann is taller than Beth is an iconic representation of
the respective heights of the two individuals, and we use the
following sort of diagram to denote such a model:
Ann   Beth
The further premise, Beth is taller than Cath, updates the
model:
Ann Beth Cath
Mem Cogn (2012) 40:266–279 267This model yields the transitive conclusion Ann is taller
than Cath. No alternative model of the premises refutes this
conclusion, so the inference is valid. As Peirce (1958)
realized, iconic models have the great advantage that they
can yield relations that are not asserted overtly in the
premises.
The hypothesis that spatial, temporal, and other sorts of
relations are represented in iconic models has received
support from behavioral experiments (e.g., Vandierendonck
& De Vooght, 1997) and fMRI studies (Goel & Dolan,
2001). But there is evidence that the linguistic form of
relational terms, such as left or right, also influences the
conclusions that individuals draw in relational inferences
(Van der Henst & Schaeken, 2005). Studies have investi-
gated how individuals construct mental models for spatial
relations (Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 2005; Rauh et al.,
2005; Van der Henst, Chevallier, Schaeken, Mercier, &
Noveck, 2008). These studies have shown that when
descriptions are compatible with more than one spatial
layout, individuals tend to construct a particular model; that
is, the reasoning system has a preferred model (e.g., Jahn,
Knauff, & Johnson-Laird, 2007; Ragni, Knauff, & Nebel,
2005; Rauh et al., 2005), but individuals may also use a
single representation that encodes the spatial indeterminacy
(e.g., Schaeken, Van der Henst, & Schroyens, 2007;
Vandierendonck, Dierckx, & De Vooght, 2004).
The model theory also accounts for sentential reasoning
(e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). For instance, a
biconditional of the grammatical form There is a triangle
if and only if there is a circle has a mental model that
represents the presence of the two shapes within the same
possibility. Individuals are usually aware that there is
another possibility, corresponding to the case in which the
if clause is false, but they do not normally represent it
explicitly (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, 2002). Instead,
they represent this possibility in a model that has no explicit
content—that is, an implicit model. The mental models of
the preceding biconditional are, accordingly,
$ o
:::
where the ellipsis denotes the implicit model and each line
in the diagram corresponds to a model of a different
possibility. When the task is not too burdensome, individ-
uals can flesh out their mental models into fully explicit
models that represent both possibilities to which the
biconditional refers:
$
not$
o
noto
where not-Δ represents that there is not a triangle—that is,
the falsity of the clause.
The principle of truth postulates that mental models do not
represent what is false. Hence, the mental models above do
not represent the cases that the biconditional rules out as false,
i.e., a triangle without a circle, and a circle without a triangle.
These cases are constructed by inference from the fully
explicit models (Barres & Johnson-Laird, 2003). The princi-
ple of truth also applies at a lower level: Mental models do
not represent the clauses in the premises that are false in
possibilities. For instance, an exclusive disjunction of the
grammatical form Either there is a triangle or else there isn’t
a circle (but both clauses cannot be true) yields mental
models of the two alternative possibilities:
$
noto
The first of these models does not represent that it is false that
there isn’tac i r c l ein this possibility—that is, there is a
circle. Likewise, the second model does not represent that it
is false that there is a triangle in this possibility. Only the
fully explicit models represent this information:
$ o
not$ noto
Individuals usually do not realize that the disjunction is
equivalent to the earlier biconditional, and this phenomenon
corroborates the hypothesis that they normally rely on mental
models, especially in the case of disjunctions (Johnson-Laird
et al., 1992). Experiments have corroborated the model
theory of sentential connectives: Inferences are harder with
an increase in the number of models that reasoners have to
take into account; reasoners tend to overlook models; and
reasoners fall into error when the failure to represent what is
false matters (see, e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2006,f o rar e v i e w ) .
The model theory of reasoning based on connectives
and relations
We now show how the model theory applies to inferences
based on both connectives and relations, and we derive five
main predictions. The first prediction concerns the differ-
ence between inferences that depend solely on connectives
and those that also depend on relations. Consider a
biconditional of relations, such as
Ann is in the same place as Beth if and only if Beth is
in the same place as Cath.
It calls for the integration of a model of the first clause with
a model of the second clause. Reasoners who do not
integrate the two models of relations can still infer that Beth
is in the same place as Cath from the categorical assertion
that Ann is the same place as Beth. Such inferences
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ac o m p o u n dp r e m i s e ,a n dw er e f e rt ot h e ma sy i e l d i n ga
“nontransitive” conclusion. In order to make a transitive
inference that Ann is in the same place as Cath,
reasoners have to integrate the two models into a single
model in which all three individuals are in the same
place. The first prediction is accordingly that reasoners
should make nontransitive inferences more often than
transitive inferences.
The second prediction concerns integrated mental mod-
els and sentential connectives. The integrated mental
models of the biconditional above are as follows, where
the rectangle denotes a single place and the ellipsis denotes
an implicit model representing the possibility in which both
clauses are false:
Ann Beth Cath
.    .    .
In contrast, the logically equivalent exclusive disjunction
with a negative second clause
Either Ann is in the same place as Beth or else Beth is
not in the same place as Cath.
has the following mental models:
Ann Beth
Beth Cath
These two mental models cannot be integrated because they
represent two alternative possibilities. The processing
capacity of working memory is limited (e.g., Capon,
Handley, & Dennis, 2003), and a single mental model with
content imposes less of a load on working memory than do
two such mental models (Barrouillet & Lecas, 1999). The
second prediction of the theory is therefore that reasoning,
in general, should be easier to make from biconditionals
than from exclusive disjunctions.
The third prediction is that inferences should be easier to
make from symmetric relations, such as is in the same place
as, than from asymmetric relations, such as is taller than,
because the former do not require participants to remember
which entity is the subject of a relation and which entity is
its object, whereas the latter calls for this information to be
kept in mind.
The fourth prediction concerns inferences based on a
compound premise containing a connective and a
categorical premise, such as Ann is taller than Beth.
The prediction concerns an interaction, and we describe it
first for biconditionals and then for disjunctions. The
mental models of a biconditional represent the possibility
in which both clauses are true, and implicitly the
possibility in which both clauses are false. However,
previous research has shown that reasoners are quite likely
to flesh out the implicit model of a biconditional explicitly
(see, e.g., Johnson-Laird et al., 1992). Hence, there is not
a marked difference between drawing a conclusion when a
clause is affirmed and drawing a conclusion when a clause
is denied. It follows that these two sorts of nontransitive
inference should be of comparable difficulty:
Ann is taller than Beth if and only if Beth is taller than
Cath.
Ann is taller than Beth.
What follows? [Beth is taller than Cath.]
and
Ann is taller than Beth if and only if Beth is taller than
Cath.
Ann is not taller than Beth.
What follows? [Beth is not taller than Cath.]
However, if individuals form an integrated mental model
of both clauses in the biconditional, which represents
the relative heights of all three individuals, they can
draw the transitive conclusion that Ann is taller than
Cath. The cost of this integration is that they will be
much less likely to flesh out the implicit model of the
case in which both clauses are false. Hence, it follows
that the transitive inference from the premises in the
first example above should be easier to make than the
transitive inference from the premises in the second
example, which yields the conclusion that Ann is not
taller than Cath.
The two disjunctive inferences logically equivalent to
the examples above are as follows:
Ann istallerthan Beth orelseBethisnot tallerthanCath.
Ann is taller than Beth.
What follows?
and
Ann is taller than Beth or else Beth is not taller than
Cath.
Ann is not taller than Beth.
What follows?
The disjunction has two mental models of alternative
possibilities. In the first inference, the categorical premise
matches the first model, and a conclusion can be drawn
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the second clause. But in the second inference, the
categorical premise eliminates the first model of the
disjunction, and the second model yields an immediate
nontransitive conclusion. Both nontransitive and transitive
inferences should therefore be easier to make when a
premise denies a clause of a disjunction than when a
premise affirms a clause of a disjunction.
The predicted patterns of difficulty in these inferences is
complicated, so we summarize the interaction:
& When a premise affirms a clause in a biconditional,
transitive inferences should be easier to make than
when a premise denies a clause in a biconditional. (For
the reason that we explained earlier, this prediction does
not apply to nontransitive inferences.)
& When a premise denies a clause in a disjunction,
nontransitive and transitive inferences should be easier
to make than when a premise affirms a clause in a
disjunction.
The fifth prediction is that systematic fallacies should
occur when inferences about possibilities depend on
overcoming the principle of truth and representing what is
false. Previous studies have shown that such fallacies occur
in various domains and can be sufficiently compelling to
yield “illusory inferences” (see, e.g., Johnson-Laird,
Legrenzi, Girotto, & Legrenzi, 2000; Johnson-Laird &
Savary, 1999; Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2009). As an
example, consider this problem based on an exclusive
disjunction:
Either Adam is in the same place as Beth or else Beth
is not in the same place as Cath.
Is it possible that Adam and Beth are alone in the same
place?
The mental models of the premise are as follows:
Adam Beth
Beth Cath
The first of these models predicts that individuals
should respond “Yes.” The fully explicit models of the
premise take into account that one clause is true and
that the other clause is false. Hence, when Adam is in
the same place as Beth, it is false that Beth is not in the
same place as Cath—that is, Beth is in the same place as
Cath—so all three of them are in the same place. When
Beth is not in the same place as Cath, then it is false that
Adam is in the same place as Beth, and so either all three
are in different places, or Adam and Cath could be in the
same place. The fully explicit models of the disjunction
are therefore as follows:
Adam Beth Cath
Adam Beth Cath
Beth Adam Cath
Each line in the diagram above represents a different
possibility. Hence, the valid inference is “No, Adam and
Beth cannot be alone in the same place,” and the previous
inference is fallacious. Now, consider the case in which the
premise is followed by the question
Is it possible that Beth and Cath are alone in the same
place?
The mental models yield the answer “No.” And, in this
case, the fully explicit models also yield this answer. The
inference is a control, which the model theory predicts
should elicit the correct response. Analogous predictions
apply to inferences based on biconditionals.
Our experiments were designed to test the five predic-
tions that we have described. They used the two simple
binary relations that we have illustrated above: is in the
same place as and is taller than. In a preliminary study,
participants had to draw diagrams to represent these
relations in affirmative and negative assertions. In almost
every case, they used vertical bars or schematic drawings of
humans to represent heights, and they used boxes or
parentheses to represent different places. The experiments
were carried out in Polish, which has unambiguous ways to
express an exclusive disjunction, albo A albo B (either A or
else B), and a biconditional, A wtedy i tylko wtedy, gdy B (A
if and only if B), where A and B are clauses. Both of these
expressions are probably used more frequently in daily life
in Polish than in English (see the corpus of the Polish
language: korpus.pwn.pl). For the rest of this article, we use
the term “disjunction” to refer to an exclusive disjunction.
Experiment 1
The aim of this experiment was to test the theory’s
predictions about inferences such as
Ann is taller than Beth if and only if Beth is taller than
Cath.
Ann is taller than Beth.
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conclusion—that is, one concerning only a single clause
in the biconditional:
Beth is taller than Cath.
But individuals who integrate their mental model of the
biconditional can also draw the transitive conclusion
Ann is taller than Cath.
The theory predicts that both sorts of inference should be
easier to make from biconditional premises than from
logically equivalent disjunctive premises with a negative
second clause. The experiment also tested the prediction that
reasoning from a symmetric relation (is in the same place as)
should be easier than reasoning from an asymmetric relation
(is taller than). The experiment used a task in which the
participants drew their own conclusions from premises.
Method
Participants A group of 32 students of the Warsaw School
of Social Sciences and Humanities participated in the
experiment as a course requirement. None of them had
any training in logic beyond an introductory course, which
is obligatory in all Polish universities.
Design and materials The participants acted as their own
controls and carried out two inferences of each of eight sorts.
Oneinferenceofeachsortconcernedasymmetricrelationand
the other inference concerned an asymmetric relation. Every
inference concerned three referents, in the order A–B and B–
C, in the two clauses of the compound premise. In half of the
trials, both clauses were affirmative, and in the other half, the
first clause was affirmative and the second clause was
negative. The resulting pairs of relations were presented
either in a biconditional or a disjunction. Each sentence was
accompanied by a categorical premise that affirmed either
the first or the second clause in the compound premise. The
resulting 16 inferences all yielded a valid conclusion, so the
experiment also contained two filler inferences that did not
yield a valid conclusion. All of the experimental inferences
in Experiment 1 are presented in Appendix A. All of the
inferences were about different people, and three different
names were assigned at random to them.
Procedure The participants were tested in four small groups,
and the problems were presented in booklets. The instructions
stated that the aim of the study was to see how people
understand assertions describing different sorts of relations.
The key instructions were as follows:
The experiment concerns a number of situations, which
are each described in two sentences. Your task is to draw a
correct conclusion to each inference, that is, a conclusion
t h a tm u s tb et r u eg i v e nt h a tt h et w os e n t e n c e s...a r et r u e .
Please analyze carefully each situation, and write down in
the appropriate place the conclusion that you think is
correct.Ifyouareconvincedthatnocorrectconclusioncan
be drawn in a particular case, write this as your answer.
The participants wrote down their answers in the space
provided below each pair of premises.
Results and discussion
The overall percentages of valid conclusions, both non-
transitive and transitive, were as follows:
Biconditionals of symmetric relations: 84%
Biconditionals of asymmetric relations: 72%
Disjunctions of symmetric relations: 55%
Disjunctions of asymmetric relations: 46%
The percentages of valid conclusions to each problem are
shown in Appendix A, and the preceding pattern did not differ
reliably whether the categorical premise affirmed the first or
the second clause in the compound premise. As the model
theory predicts, the participants drew more valid conclusions
from biconditionals (78%) than from disjunctions (51%;
Wilcoxon test, z =4 . 4 4 ,p < .001). Likewise, as the theory
predicts, they drew more valid conclusions from symmetric
relations (70%) than from asymmetric relations (59%;
Wilcoxon test, z =2 . 3 8 ,p = .009). There was no reliable
interaction between the two sorts of connective and the two
sorts of relation (Wilcoxon test, z =0 . 0 5 ,p = .96, two tailed).
The transitive inferences could be drawn from four asymmet-
ric and seven symmetric problems (see Appx. A). Only 32%
of the answers to those inferences were correct transitive
conclusions, and only 5 out of 32 participants did not give any
transitive conclusion in the task. These 5 individuals may not
have built any integrated models of the premises. To compare
transitive inferences from biconditionals and disjunctions, we
examined only those pairs with the same categorical premise
and the same conclusion. As the model theory predicts, the
participants drew more valid transitive conclusions from
biconditionals (41%) than from disjunctions (11%; Wilcoxon
test, z =3 . 0 5 ,p = .001). But there was no reliable difference in
valid transitive conclusions from symmetric (28%) and
asymmetric (23%; Wilcoxon test, z =. 4 1 ,p =. 3 4 )r e l a t i o n s .
The interaction between the two variables was not significant
(Wilcoxon test, z =1 . 3 3 ,p = .18, two tailed). Overall, the
results corroborated the model theory: The participants made
a greater number of valid inferences about relations from
biconditionals than from disjunctions, both for nontransitive
conclusions from a single clause and for transitive inferences
that combined individuals in the separate clauses.
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Themainaimofthisexperimentwastotestthemodeltheory’s
predicted interaction between the categorical premise’sr o l e
and the connective in the compound premise: Affirmations
should yield more transitive inferences from biconditional
premises, whereas denials should yield more transitive
inferences from disjunctive premises. With that aim, the
experiment used only the more difficult, asymmetric relation
is taller than, and each biconditional occurred with equiv-
alent inferences from disjunctions. The numbers of negations
were matched in the biconditional and disjunctive inferences.
Method
Participants A group of 31 psychology undergraduates
from the same population as before took part in the study as
a course requirement. Two of the participants failed to give
conclusions to all the inferences, and two others misunder-
stood the task, so the analysis of the results concerned the
remaining 27 participants.
Design, materials, and procedure Each participant made
inferences from a biconditional and from a disjunction of
two relations, both of which concerned three referents in
the order A–B and B–C in the two clauses of the compound
premise. The biconditionals consisted of either two affir-
mative or two negative relations:
A is taller than B if and only if B is taller than C
and
A is not taller than B if and only if B is not taller than C.
The disjunctions had the same fully explicit models as these
two biconditionals:
A is taller than B or else B is not taller than C
and
A is not taller than B or else B is taller than C.
The categorical premise either affirmed or denied one clause
in the compound premise, either the first or the second clause.
These manipulations resulted in eight biconditional and eight
disjunctive inferences, half of them with an affirmative
categorical and half with a negative categorical. Additional
twofillerinferencesdidnotyieldavalidconclusion.Allofthe
resulting 18 inferences referred to three different individuals.
Four differentordersof inferences were assignedatrandomto
the participants in the study. The full set of experimental
inferences is stated in Appendix B. The procedure and
instructions were identical to those in the previous experi-
ment, and the participants had to draw their own conclusions
or respond that “nothing follows.”
Results
Table 1 presents the percentages of valid nontransitive and
transitive conclusions for both sorts of compound premise,
and the results for the individual inferences are presented in
Appendix B. Overall, the participants drew more non-
transitive inferences (46%) than transitive inferences (11%;
Wilcoxon test, z = 3.77, p < .001). They drew more valid
inferences of both sorts from biconditionals (78%) than
from disjunctions (36% valid; Wilcoxon test, z = 4.24, p <
.001). The frequencies of transitive conclusions did not
differ overall, either between biconditional and disjunctive
inferences (Wilcoxon test, z = 0.96, p = .33, two tailed) or
between inferences based on categorical premises affirming
or negating clauses in the compound premise (Wilcoxon
test, z = 1.54, p = .12, two tailed). The predicted interaction
between these two variables was reliable for transitive
inferences overall (Wilcoxon test, z = 3.07, p = .001), but
although the trend for nontransitive inferences from
disjunctions was in the predicted direction, it was not
reliable (Wilcoxon test, z = 1.18, p = .24). Hence, with this
one exception, the results corroborated the model theory’s
predictions for these inferences.
Table 1 The percentages of valid inferences from biconditionals and disjunctions paired with categorical premises that affirm or deny one of their
clauses
Biconditional Premise Disjunctive Premise
Categorical premise affirms
a clause in biconditional
Categorical premise denies a
clause in biconditional
Categorical premise affirms
a clause in disjunction
Categorical premise denies
a clause in disjunction
Valid nontransitive
conclusions
63 68 22 32
Valid transitive conclusions 22 4 6 12
Nontransitive conclusions assert one of the clauses in the compound premise, whereas transitive conclusions assert a relation between items in
both clauses
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Our final two experiments tested the model theory’s
prediction of systematic fallacies when inferences about
possibilities depend on overcoming the principle of truth
and representing what is false. The experiments examined
the predicted fallacies and control inferences, and both sorts
of inference depended on connectives and relations.
Experiment 3a was carried out online, and Experiment 3b
was a face-to-face test. Otherwise, the two experiments
were identical, so we report them together.
Method
Participants We carried out Experiment 3a over the Internet,
and 42 participants were recruited from among first-year
psychology students enrolled in a course of economic
psychology in weekend classes at the Warsaw School of Social
Sciences and Humanities. Their mean age was 39 years, and
69% had a higher-education diploma. We carried out Experi-
ment 3b in a direct test of 40 undergraduate psychology
studentsfromthesamepopulationasinourearlierexperiments.
Design and materials The participants acted as their own
controls, and they made four inferences about possibilities
from a biconditional and four inferences about possibilities
from a disjunction. The premises concerned three referents in
the order A–B and B–C in the two clauses. There were two
different biconditional premises and two different disjunctive
premises (see Table 2 below). Each compound premise was
paired on separate trials with two different questions about
possible relations. One question was “illusory”: Mental
models yielded a fallacious answer, and the valid answer
depended on fully explicit models. The other question was a
control: Mental models and fully explicit models both yielded
the same valid answer. In four problems, the valid answer
was, "yes", and in the other four the valid answer was, "no".
Each inference used three different names of individuals,
assigned once at random to the premises. In Experiment 3a, a
single set of problems was presented in a different random
order to each of the participants. In Experiment 3b, three
different sets of eight triples of common names were assigned
at random to the problems. The three sets of problems were
allocated at random to the participants and were presented to
each of them in a random order.
Procedure In Experiment 3a, the participants were recruited
by e-mail, and a commercial website (www.wbadanie.pl)w a s
the server for the experiment. This site placed the usual
constraints on Web experiments—for instance, the test could
be taken only once from a computer. In Experiment 3b, the
participants were tested in two groups but worked individu-
ally. In both experiments, the key instructions were “On each
trial, you will see a sentence describing a situation, and a
question. Your task is to answer the question by deciding
whether or not the situation it describes is possible given the
truth of the sentence.” Online, the participants chose their
answers by selecting one of two buttons: “Yes, it is possible”
or “No, it is impossible.” Each problem was presented on a
single screen and had to be answered in order to go on to the
next inference. In the face-to-face experiment, the participants
ticked one of two boxes under the problem, corresponding to
the two options.
Results and discussion
Table2 presents the percentages of “yes” and “no” answers to
each inference in the two experiments. The results were
similar in both studies. As the model theory predicts, the
participants were correct more often for control inferences
(74% and 74% for the two experiments, respectively) than for
the illusory inferences (45% and 44% for the two experi-
ments). The difference was reliable in both experiments
(Wilcoxon tests, z = 3.99 and 4.32, p < .001, for both tests).
The participants were more accurate with biconditional
inferences (66% and 68% for the two experiments) than with
disjunctive inferences (53% and 51%; Wilcoxon tests, z =
2.24 and 2.29, p = .012, for both tests). Correct answers were
more frequent for biconditional illusory inferences (54% in
Exp. 3a and 59% in Exp. 3b) than for disjunctive illusory
inferences (36% in Exp. 3a and 30% in Exp. 3b; Wilcoxon
tests, z =2 . 1 7 ,p = .03, and z =3 . 2 9 ,p = .001). This
performance with the disjunctive illusory inferences was
reliably worse than the chance probability of 50% (Wilcoxon
tests, z =2 . 8 5 ,p < .003, and z =1 . 8 5 ,p < .04, for Exps. 3a
and 3b, respectively).
Both experiments corroborated the model theory’s
prediction. When mental models yield a correct response,
inferences are reliably easier to make than when only fully
explicit models yield a correct response. The results also
confirmed, once again, that inferences tend to be easier to
make from biconditionals than from disjunctions. The
similarity between the results of the online and face-to-
face experiments is reassuring about the use of Web-based
studies of reasoning.
General discussion
The present studies examined a novel sort of reasoning that
depends both on sentential connectives such as or else,
which interrelate clauses, and on relations such as is in the
same place as, which interrelate entities. Connectives and
relations have hitherto been studied separately, so the aim
was to test whether a theory based on the idea that
individuals construct mental models of possibilities could
Mem Cogn (2012) 40:266–279 273Table 2 The problems in Experiments 3a (online) and 3b (face-to-face), their mental models and fully explicit models with square brackets
demarcating separate places, and the percentages of valid (in bold) and invalid responses
Compound Premises With Illusory and Control Questions 
Mental Models and Fully 
Explicit Models for the 
Premises 
Inferences With Disjunctive Compound Premises 
1. A is not in the same place as B or else B is not in the same place as 
C.
Illusory question: 
Is it possible that all three are in different places? 
  3a:  Yes  60  No 40 
  3b:  Yes  63  No 37
Control question: 
Is it possible that A and C are in different places? 
  3a:  Yes 88  No 12
  3b:  Yes 88 No 13 
Mental models 
[A] [B] 
  [B]  [C] 
Fully explicit models 
[A] [B C] 
  [A  B]  [C] 
2. A is in the same place as B or else B is not in the same place as C. 
Illusory question: 
Is it possible that A and B alone are in the same place? 
  3a:  Yes  69  No 31 
  3b:  Yes  78  No 23 
Mental models 
[A B] 
  [B]  [C] 
Fully explicit models 
[A B C] 
  [A] [B] [C] 
  [B]  [A  C] 
Control question: 
Is it possible that B and C alone are in the same place? 
  3a:  Yes  48  No 52
  3b:  Yes  45  No 55
Inferences With Biconditional Compound Premises 
3. A is in the same place as B if and only if B is in the same place as C. 
Illusory question: 
Mental models 
[A B C] 
. . . 
274 Mem Cogn (2012) 40:266–279explain why some of these inferences are harder to make
than others. The model theory predicts a difference between
inferences from biconditionals, such as
Ann is in the same place as Beth if and only if Beth is
in the same place as Cath.
and inferences based on logically equivalent exclusive
disjunctions,
Ann is in the same place as Beth or else Beth is not in
the same place as Cath.
The biconditional has a single mental model of a possibility
and an implicit model with no content, whereas the
disjunction has two mental models for each alternative
possibility. It follows that inferences in general should be
easier to make from biconditionals than from disjunctions.
Experiments 1 and 2 corroborated this prediction.
Reasoners do not have to keep track of the arguments of
symmetrical relations, because A is in the same place as B is
equivalent to B is in the same place as A. But they do have
to keep track of the arguments of asymmetrical relations,
because A is taller than B is not equivalent to Bi st a l l e rt h a n
A. Hence, inferences from symmetrical relations should be
easier to make than inferences from asymmetrical
relations. Experiment 1 also corroborated this prediction.
Consider the following inferential problem:
Ann istallerthanBeth ifand only ifBeth istaller thanCath.
Ann is taller than Beth.
What follows?
Individuals could build a mental model that represents each
clause separately, or they could integrate the information from
the two clauses. In the first case, they could draw the
nontransitive conclusion Beth is taller than Cath.I nt h e
Table 2 (continued)
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Compound Premises With Illusory and Control Questions 
Mental Models and Fully 
Explicit Models for the 
Premises 
Is it possible that A and C are the only two in the same place? 
  3a:  Yes 52 No 48 
  3b:  Yes 45 No 55 
Control question: 
Is it possible that A and B are the only two in the same place? 
  3a:  Yes  17  No 83
  3b:  Yes  30  No 70
Fully explicit models 
[A B C] 
  [A] [B] [C] 
  [B]  [A  C] 
4. A is in the same place as B if and only if B is not in the same place 
as C. 
Illusory question: 
Is it possible that B and C are in the same place? 
  3a:  Yes 55 No 45 
  3b:  Yes 73 No 29 
Control question: 
Is it possible that A is not in the same place as C 
  3a:  Yes 74 No 26 
  3b:  Yes 85 No 15 
Mental models 
[A B] [C] 
. . . 
Fully explicit models 
[A B] [C] 
  [A]  [B  C] second case, they can draw the transitive conclusion Ann is
taller than Cath. The integration of information from separate
clauses takes work, so the theory predicts that reasoners
should be more likely to infer nontransitive than transitive
conclusions. Experiment 2 corroborated this prediction.
The theory also predicts an interaction for transitive
inferences. Transitive inferences should be easier to make
from biconditionals when a premise affirms one of their
clauses, but they should be easier to make from disjunctions
when a premise denies one of their clauses. Experiment 2
corroborated this interaction in a study of inferences from
the relation is taller than. The principle underlying the
prediction about transitive inferences was straightforward—
an affirmation of a clause in a biconditional yields the
transitive conclusion from an integrated mental model,
whereas a denial of a clause does not—it calls for models to
be fleshed out in a fully explicit way. Likewise, a denial of
a clause in disjunction eliminates one of its models, and the
conclusion follows from an integrated version of its other
model, whereas an affirmation of a clause calls for its
model to be fleshed out with a fully explicit model of the
falsity of the second clause. The complete motivation for
this prediction is described in the introduction.
The principle of truth,whichis embodied in mental models,
predicts that it is harder to make valid inferences that depend
on taking into account what is false. For example, reasoners
should tend to respond “yes” to the following problem:
Ann is in the same place as Beth or else Beth is not in
the same place as Cath.
IsitpossiblethatAnnandBethaloneareinthesameplace?
The mentalmodelsofthe premise yieldanaffirmative answer,
because they represent two possibilities: Ann and Beth in the
same place, and Beth and Cath in different places. The fully
explicit models show that the affirmative answer is wrong,
because when Ann and Beth are in the same place, so too is
Cath (from the falsity of the second clause in the disjunction).
Individuals have difficulties with such inferences, but, as the
theory also predicts, they do reliably better with control
inferences for which the valid answer is not affected by a
failure to represent what is false (Exps. 3a and 3b).
In sum, five main phenomena corroborated the predic-
tions of the model theory:
& Individuals made more valid nontransitive than transi-
tive inferences.
& They made more valid inferences from biconditionals
than from disjunctions.
& They made valid inferences more often from symmetric
relations, such as is in the same place as, than from
asymmetric relations, such as is taller than.
& They made transitive inferences more often when a
categorical premise affirmed one of the clauses in a
biconditional than when it denied one of the clauses, but
the difference switched round with disjunctions.
& They made more valid inferences from mental models
than from fully explicit models that represented both
what is true and what is false.
The results accordingly support the theory that reasoning
from relations and connectives depends on mental models,
which embody the principle of truth. An alternative theory
could in principle account for these results. It is always
possible to devise such an account after the fact, but to the
best of our knowledge, no other current theory of reasoning
makes all five predictions.
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Appendix A
Inferences in Experiment 1 and the percentages (in
parentheses) of participants who spontaneously drew valid
transitive conclusions (possible only for four asymmetric
and seven symmetric problems) and valid nontransitive
conclusions about single clauses
Biconditional Inferences Disjunctive Inferences
Asymmetric Relations
11 ′
A is taller than B if and only
if B is taller than C.
A is taller than B or else B
is taller than C.
A is taller than B. A is taller than B.
Valid transitive conclusion: Valid nontransitive conclusion:
A is taller than C. (34) B is not taller than C. (53)
Valid nontransitive conclusion:
B is taller than C. (50)
22 ′
A is taller than B if and only
if B is taller than C.
A is taller than B or else B
is taller than C.
B is taller than C. B is taller than C.
Valid transitive conclusion: Valid nontransitive conclusion:
A is taller than C. (16) A is not taller than B. (41)
Valid nontransitive conclusion:
A is taller than B. (75)
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A is taller than B if and only
if B is not taller than C.
A is taller than B or else B
is not taller than C.
A is taller than B. A is taller than B.
Valid nontransitive conclusion: Valid transitive conclusion:
B is not taller than C. (59) A is taller than C. (12)
Valid nontransitive conclusion:
B is taller than C. (19)
44 ′
A is taller than B if and only
if B is not taller than C.
A is taller than B or else B
is not taller than C.
B is not taller than C. B is not taller than C.
Valid nontransitive conclusion: Valid transitive conclusion:
A is taller than B. (53) A is not taller than C. (19)
Valid nontransitive conclusion:
A is not taller than B. (41)
Symmetric Relations
55 ′
A is in the same place as B if and
only if B is in the same place as C.
A is in the same place as
B or else
A is in the same place as B. B is in the same place as C.
Valid transitive conclusion: A is in the same place as B.
A is in the same place as C. (47) Valid transitive conclusion:
Valid nontransitive conclusion: A is not in the same place as
C. (16) B is in the same place as C. (38)
Valid nontransitive conclusion:
B is not in the same place as
C. (59)
66 ′
A is in the same place as B
if and only if
A is in the same place as B or
else
B is in the same place as C. B is in the same place as C.
B is in the same place as C. B is in the same place as C.
Valid transitive conclusion: Valid transitive conclusion:
A is in the same place as C. (53) A is not in the same place as
C. (31)
Valid nontransitive conclusion: Valid nontransitive conclusion:
A is in the same place as B. (38) A is not in the same place as
B. (44)
77 ′
A is in the same place as B
if and only if
A is in the same place as B or
else
B is not in the same place as C. B is not in the same place as C.
A is in the same place as B. A is in the same place as B.
Valid transitive conclusion: Valid transitive conclusion:
A is not in the same place
as C. (31)
A is in the same place as C. (9)
Valid nontransitive conclusion: Valid nontransitive conclusion:
B is not in the same place
as C. (47)
B is in the same place as C. (25)
88 ′
A is in the same place as B
if and only if
A is in the same place as B or
else
B is not in the same place as C. B is not in the same place as C.
B is not in the same place as C. B is not in the same place as C.
Valid transitive conclusion: Valid nontransitive conclusion:
A is not in the same place
as C. (16)
A is not in the same place as B.
(38)
Valid nontransitive conclusion:
A is in the same place as B. (66)
Appendix B:
Inferences in Experiment 2 and the percentages (in
parentheses) of participants who spontaneously drew valid
transitive conclusions and valid nontransitive conclusions
Biconditional Inferences Disjunctive Logical
Equivalents
11 ′
A is taller than B if and only
if B is taller than C.
A is taller than B or else B
is not taller than C.
A is taller than B. A is taller than B.
Valid transitive conclusion: Valid transitive conclusion:
A is taller than C. (33) A is taller than C. (11)
Valid nontransitive conclusion: Valid nontransitive
conclusion:
B is taller than C. (59) B is taller than C. (26)
22 ′
A is taller than B if and only
if B is taller than C.
A is taller than B or else B
is not taller than C.
B is taller than C. B is taller than C.
Valid transitive conclusion: Valid transitive conclusion:
A is taller than C. (22) A is taller than C. (18)
Valid nontransitive conclusion: Valid nontransitive
conclusion:
A is taller than B. (70) A is taller than B. (18)
33 ′
A is taller than B if and only
if B is taller than C.
A is taller than B or else B
is not taller than C.
A is not taller than B. A is not taller than B.
Valid transitive conclusion: Valid transitive conclusion:
A is not taller than C. (4) A is not taller than C. (4)
Valid nontransitive conclusion: Valid nontransitive
conclusion:
B is not taller than C. (67) B is not taller than C. (48)
44 ′
A is taller than B if and only
if B is taller than C.
A is taller than B or else B
is not taller than C.
B is not taller than C. B is not taller than C.
Valid transitive conclusion: Valid transitive conclusion:
A is not taller than C. (11) A is not taller than C. (0)
Valid nontransitive conclusion: Valid nontransitive conclusion:
A is not taller than B. (67) A is not taller than B. (11)
55 '
A is not taller than B if and
only if B is not taller than C.
A is not taller than B or else
B is taller than C.
Mem Cogn (2012) 40:266–279 277A is not taller than B. A is not taller than B.
Valid transitive conclusion: Valid transitive conclusion:
A is not taller than C. (7) A is not taller than C. (7)
Valid nontransitive conclusion: Valid nontransitive
conclusion:
B is not taller than C. (52) B is not taller than C. (22)
66 ′
A is not taller than B if and
only if B is not taller than C.
A is not taller than B or else
B is taller than C.
B is not taller than C. B is not taller than C.
Valid transitive conclusion: Valid transitive conclusion:
A is not taller than C. (26) A is not taller than C. (15)
Valid nontransitive conclusion: Valid nontransitive conclusion:
A is not taller than B. (70) A is not taller than B. (26)
77 ′
A is not taller than B if and
only if B is not taller than C.
A is not taller than B or
else B is taller than C.
A is taller than B. A is taller than B.
Valid transitive conclusion: Valid transitive conclusion:
A is taller than C. (0) A is taller than C. (11)
Valid nontransitive conclusion: Valid nontransitive conclusion:
B is taller than C. (70) B is taller than C. (33)
88 ′
A is not taller than B if and
only if B is not taller than C.
A is not taller than B or
else B is taller than C.
B is taller than C. B is taller than C.
Valid transitive conclusion: Valid transitive conclusion:
A is taller than C. (0) A is taller than C. (7)
Valid nontransitive conclusion: Valid nontransitive conclusion:
A is taller than B. (67) A is taller than B. (30)
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